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CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Airline Depreciation Po!icy
The American trunk airlines have followed different policies with re-
spect to accounting for aircraft depreciation and the investment tax credit
provision of the 1962 Revenue Act.' These policies have resulted in differ-
ences in profit reporting, tax consequences, and cash flow which make year
to year comparisons of the airlines' stated financial reports somewhat un-
reliable.
The basic policy of all the trunk lines is to compute depreciation and
obsolescence by the straight line method over the estimated useful life of
their aircraft and engines in their reports to the Civil Aeronautics Board
and for use in their balance sheets.' This contrasts sharply with deprecia-
tion for federal income tax purposes which is uniformly reported on an
accelerated basis in accordance with certificates of convenience and neces-
sity and the "declining balance" or "sum of the years digits" methods.
This is to reduce or eliminate current tax liabilities and increase the cash
flow of the airline industry. This depreciation supports the credit extended
to purchase new equipment. Cash which is generated by depreciation
charges is available for debt retirement as well as to meet current operating
expenses and thus provides encouragement to lenders. Between 1958 and
1961, the period of major jet aircraft initiation, depreciation accruals for
equipment for the domestic trunk airlines increased eighty-two per cent
from 120 million dollars to 218 million dollars and has remained stable
since.
The income statements of the airlines contain an account for deferred
federal income tax liability to reflect the reduction in current tax resulting
from depreciation taken for tax purposes in excess of depreciation pro-
vided for in the corporations' depreciation accounts. These accounts will
be restored to earnings in the future when depreciation allowable for tax
purposes is less than that yielded by the straight line method. The follow-
ing chart indicates the potential profit not yet reported.
Provision for Deferred Income Tax Liability in 19625
American $10,339,000 Northwest $5,665,500
Braniff 796,000 United 2,189,000
Continental 1,814,381 Delta 5,682,000
National 411,000 Pan American 1,189,177
The major policy differences in airline depreciation result from differ-
ences in the estimated useful life of equipment. The experience of the
airlines prior to the jet age indicated that technological advances forced
obsolescence of various aircraft types very quickly although the equip-
ment was still very serviceable. It was generally believed, as reflected in
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 38, 46, 48, and 181.
1963 Moody's Transportation Manual p. 1270 et. seq.
3 113 The Magazine of W'all Street and Business Analyst p. 606 (1964).
'Value Line Investment Survey, Jan. 31, 1964, p. 204.
a 1963 Moody's Transportation Manual p. 1270 et. seq.
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the depreciation policies followed, that a ten-year life was a conservative
period for depreciation purposes at the start of the jet age with the ex-
pectation that supersonic transports were at least ten years away. The
trunk carriers felt that frequent re-equipping cycles were in the past and
that, if and when the SST was introduced, it would come in gradually
allowing a normal retirement of existing craft.
In 1960 American Airlines began an industry trend by extending the
useful life of turbojet aircraft and engines to twelve years and adopted
the policy of charging rentals of leased turbine engines to expense rather
than amortizing this over the life of related aircraft.' This accounting
change increased 'earnings" 970,000 dollars in 1960. This change in man-
agement attitude toward obsolescence has spread in the industry to include
in varying degrees Eastern, National, Pan American, Western, and United.
Effective January 1, 1962, Eastern began to amortize rental payments for
leased jet aircraft over thirteen years (the lease term including options to
purchase) and extended the estimated useful life for owned jet aircraft
to twelve years with a fifteen per cent residual value. United extended
the depreciation period to fourteen years with very low estimated residual
values. Several carriers have not extended useful life estimates and have
fully depreciated a significant proportion of their fleet.7
These accounting changes have a great affect on profits reported and
make year to year comparisons unreliable indicators of actual operational
success. If Eastern Air Lines had restated its 1961 results in terms of its
present policy of depreciation, the changes in estimated useful life would
have resulted in 21,000,000 dollars less depreciation and rental expense
in that year. This distortion is compounded by differences in residual values
and in the length of the time the crafts had been operated before the
accounting change was made. These changes obviously affect the stated
book value of assets so that comparative figures on return on investment
are not reflecting an equal basis. Because changes in accounting practices
have been made at different times, if at all, and because there are in addi-
tion varying useful life estimates, the value of aircraft is determined by
as many methods as there are trunk carriers. An industry wide figure is
therefore not a valid criteria for measuring a given airline's profitability.
The national policy of encouraging investment in capital assets was
reflected in the Internal Revenue Code of 1962.8 The intent of Congress
was to provide an~amount of investment credit to be applied to the federal
income tax liability actually payable in a given year and this was the re-
sult obtained for most corporations. As a result of accelerated depreciation
used for federal income tax purposes, several airlines cannot use this credit
or can use only a part of it because they have not had significant current
tax liability. Braniff Airways records this by recognizing forty-eight per
cent of the potential credit as income in the year in which qualified
equipment is acquired.! Continental Air Lines accounts for its unused
credit by applying it as a reduction of provisions for deferred income
taxes ratably over the useful life of the equipment to which the credit
0 Id. at 1271.
' Id. at 1319. Delta Air Lines has fully depreciated most of their DC-7's and thirteen of twenty-
one Convairs of the 340/440 series and seven of eleven DC-6's.
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 38, 46, 48, and 181.
9 Moody's, op. cit. supra note 7 at 1274.
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relates." The amount of credit that is unused significantly affects financial
statements. T.W.A. had an investment credit for 1962 of approximately
8,000,000 dollars, principally applicable to aircraft and engines which it
was unable to use because the carrier showed a loss for the year.1' If re-
serve accounts were established in accord with normal accounting practice
there would be no distortion or reported income. However, when federal
income taxes actually payable are accrued and straight line depreciation
is recorded, the income reported is overstated.
The airline that actually pays little or no federal income tax receives no
benefit at all in the current year because its cash position remains the same.
Only those carriers that have sufficient revenue to take advantage of the
credit in the year it becomes available are helped. Profitable carriers that
can use the credit and those that account for it partially as income in the
year it is first available are artificially increasing reported earnings now
at the expense of later years when the credit has expired and accelerated
depreciation becomes less than straight line. At this point taxable income
will go up and reported earnings will be understated. Prior to this year 2
carriers that had revenue insufficient to incur current income tax liability
carried the credit forward much the same as a net operating loss carry for-
ward into which it might be eventually converted in the event of extended
losses by taking it as a deduction from income in the sixth year. It is
likely that this provision of the Revenue Code not only causes distortion
in profit reporting but will never help those carriers who are most in
need of financial assistance and equipment modernization.
The 1964 Revenue Act in section 203 (e) " counters the policy in reg-
ulated industries that any benefit from tax reduction should "flow
through" immediately to the customers. If the investment credit is con-
sidered as a reduction in operating costs, it would call for corresponding
rate reductions. The new law makes the treatment of any tax benefit from
investment credit as a cost reduction the option of the regulated carrier
so that the intended benefit, if any is available, will go to the investing
corporation in accordance with the original purpose of the investment
credit.
If the airline industry continues to improve financially, it may be that
the CAB will consider profit as expressed as return on investment as a
major criteria in rate making. This would demand an extended uniform
system of accounting to establish fairly comparable measures of capital
investment. This would have the favorable side effect of easing investor
analysis. The experience of the ICC in promulgating depreciation guide
lines in the rail industry may be applied to the air transport industry.
As long as airline profits do not appear excessive, this is more a theo-
retical problem than an immediate one. As the re-equiping cycle seems to
be stable for the near future, profit differences resulting from varying
depreciation policies should tend to even out before the SST's are intro-
duced. The carriers' reported depreciation for tax purposes in dollars
1 Id. at 1279.
'lid. at 1303.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 203 (a) (3) (B) of the 1964 Revenue Act repealed former § 181
which permitted a deduction in future years of unused investment credit. Under current law this
credit will be lost to some carriers.
13 Ibid.
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should on the average approach the dollars of depreciation under the
straight line method so as to be very nearly identical with that reported
to the CAB. If a given carrier elects to retain the same estimated useful
life for its aircraft, gradual retirement of old, and introduction of new
equipment will result in equivalent statements of investment in capital
assets without CAB depreciation guide lines.
Philip Larmon, Jr.
Governmental Liability -The December 1960 Air
Disaster - Is Executive Settlement Desirable?
On October 23, 1963, the United States Government, specifically the
Department of Justice, agreed to pay twenty-four per cent of whatever
damages are fixed as a result of claims and lawsuits arising from the
collision of a United Air Lines DC-8 jet with a Trans World Airlines
Super Constellation over Staten Island on December 16, 1960. United
Air Lines and Trans World Airlines agreed to pay sixty-one and fifteen
per cent respectively. The United States Government is involved due to
the fact that Federal Aviation Agency tower controllers were responsible
for initial routing instructions which had been given to each plane prior
to approaching its intended destination. It must be pointed out initially
that the government did not and has not admitted any liability for the
accident, but certain "rulebook departures" on the part of FAA con-
trollers involved apparently led the government to feel that it should
assume a portion of the responsibility
The United Air Lines jet was bound for Idlewild Airport via the Preston
"holding pattern" in New Jersey, while the Trans World Airlines Con-
stellation was scheduled to land at LaGuardia Airport by way of the
Linden, New Jersey "holding pattern." These holding patterns are defined
areas in which a plane may be kept circling while traffic is routed to the
intended airfields.' The holding patterns, or intersections as they are some-
times called, are similar to traffic circles in that they provide a distribution
area for nearby destinations. These two particular holding patterns are
approximately five to six miles apart, which is not a great distance at
present-day aircraft speeds.' All planes approaching the New York area
are routed initially by an area control center, then as the planes come
within a twenty-five mile radius from their respective destinations, the
approach control in the particular tower takes charge of further routing
and landing instructions."
The Civil Aeronautics Board Aircraft Accident Report lists the probable
cause of the collision as the fact that the United jet flew approximately
eleven miles beyond the Preston intersection coupled with the additional
factor of a change of clearance which reduced the en route flight by
about the same distance.' However, a similar investigation by representa-
'N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1963, p. 1, col. 3.
2Id., p. 33, col. 1.
3 Ibid.
SC.A.B. Aircraft Accident Report, June 18, 1962, p. 17.
'Id., p. 26.
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tives of the Air Line Pilots Association made in conjunction with the
CAB investigation was outlined in a report by the A.L.P.A. which pre-
sented a conclusion differing markedly from that of the CAB.' The
A.L.P.A. report stated that a primary contributing factor was the failure
of the area control center controller to properly maintain identification
and monitor the progress of the United jet during certain periods of time
as well as failure of area control to relay proper routing and estimates to
Idlewild approach control.7 In addition, the report found that the
LaGuardia approach control had failed to attempt a determination of the
identity of the United jet as it intruded into LaGuardia's airspace.'
United Air Lines was not amenable to the CAB report and filed a
petition for reconsideration with the CAB in which it sought to point
out a number of "rule book departures" which it alleged were made by
FAA personnel at the time of the accident.! The FAA, however, made it
quite clear that it was in complete accord with the CAB report and made
a direct refutation of United's assertions.'0 It should be emphasized, that
although the CAB report may not be used directly as evidence, it is the
"official" report and its exoneration of the FAA controllers would cer-
tainly seem to present a weighty argument for the FAA's position. How-
ever, in a hearing before a special master, individuals among the FAA wit-
nesses did acknowledge several rule book departures which were not unlike
those pointed out by United and A.L.P.A.5' Apparently, the Department
of Justice, in choosing to settle for payment of twenty-four per cent of
the damages, felt that United's accusations along with other strong evi-
dence of laxity on the part of FAA controllers, should warrant consider-
ation.
The FAA has consistently maintained that although there may have
been some variance with rule book operating procedure, this variance in
no way contributed to the accident." It is questionable whether a depar-
ture from FAA rule book operating procedure is, in itself, negligence. Un-
like certain statutes which may give rise to negligence when violated, these
rules are the internal guides for FAA personnel and may not fall into the
statutory negligence category. Certainly, rule book departures may be
evidence of negligence, but this writer could find no instance where the
theory of statutory negligence was ever propounded as applying to these
particular circumstances.
This accident involves an agency of the government and necessarily
presents the initial question of governmental liability as a matter of law.
This case concerns the federal government; and this article, due to space
limitations, must restrict itself to the problem of liability of the federal
government in such matters.
In considering governmental liability as a matter of strict law, one is
initially faced with the common law principle that a government can-
not ordinarily be held legally liable to those whom it has wronged." There
6 A.L.P.A. Accident Investigation Report, April 4, 1964, p. 15.
7 Ibid.
Ibid.
Petition For Reconsideration before C.A.B., United Airlines, Docket No. SA-3 61, p. 5.
'
0 F.A.A. News, No. 9, Jan. 18, 1961.
1 New York Times, Supra note 2.
1 Ibid.
"Wilber Nat. Bank v. U.S., 294 U.S. 120 (1934). A list of cases advocating this principle
may be found in 54 Am. Jur., sec. 94.
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is a public policy argument for governmental immunity based upon the
proposition that, for fiscal stability, a government cannot be responsible
for the untold myriad of claims which may be made against it.' In addi-
tion, the old legal maxim that "the King can do no wrong" was a culmi-
nation of the religious concept of the divine right of kings and has been
reflected in numerous early court decisions denying governmental lia-
bility.11
The federal government has waived its immunity in certain instances by:
1. creating a method whereby private bills may be sent through the
legislative process.'"
2. allowing itself to be sued by virtue of statutory enactment.'
With the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, the fed-
eral government created a more expedient method of allowing relief, and
any discussion of governmental tort liability must now necessarily con-
cern itself with this act. Section 1346 (b) of the Federal Tort Claims
Act provides, in part, the following basis for liability:
The District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions or claims
against the United States, for money damages for injury or loss of property
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred."
The above waiver of immunity would seem to be relatively clear, how-
ever the act provides the following exception which, as will be seen later,
has given the courts some difficulty:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 9
It becomes obvious that the act is capable of being interpreted in a num-
ber of ways, especially with respect to the aforementioned "exception
clause." The particularly troublesome areas with which the courts have
had to deal are the "exclusively governmental" ramifications of section
1346 (b) and the "discretionary function" problems caused by the ex-
ception clause of section 2680 (a).
These troublesome areas are dealt with in three well-known cases. The
first, Dalehite vs. United States,"° is a case involving the negligence of the
federal government in the handling and control of ammonium nitrate
14 In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907), Justice Holmes stated that a sovereign
is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or absolute theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws
on which the right depends.
"S Minnesota v. U.S., 305 U.S. 382 (1938). For a historical development of the divine right of
kings, see Sabine, A History of Political Theory 391 (3rd ed. 1961).
1 German Bank v. U.S., 148 U.S. 573 (1893).
17Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1948).
1s Ibid.
':28 U.S.C. S 2680 (1948).
2°346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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fertilizer which resulted in an explosion, causing extensive personal injury
and property damage. The United States Supreme Court held four to
three for the government, stating that the decisions which eventually
culminated in the disaster were made on a planning rather than an op-
erational level, thus coming within the statutory exception of claims based
upon a failure to perform a "discretionary function or duty." The court
also pointed out that the act is applicable only to situations involving
negligence, thus precluding the doctrine of strict liability.
Two years later, in 1955, the Supreme Court, in Indian Towing Com-
pany vs. United States,2 reasserted the position it had taken in the Dalehite
case regarding the distinction between decisions carried out on a plan-
ning level and on an operational level. This particular distinction was not
at issue in this case since the government had conceded that the Coast
Guard personnel, who had been negligent in failing to repair a light in a
lighthouse, had acted on an operational level. The Indian Towing Company
case did give rise to the problem of the language of the act dealing with
those "circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant." 2 Those circumstances mentioned in section 1346
(b) may be described as "uniquely governmental" functions, i.e. those
functions which the government alone handles. In the Indian Towing
Company case, the government argued that the act, specifically section
1346 (b), permits liability only in situations in which a private indi-
vidual would be involved as well as the government and that the Coast
Guard personnel were doing an act which was "uniquely governmental."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, found fault with the
government's argument and pointed to the familiar concept that "one
who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces re-
liance must perform his 'good samaritan' task in a careful manner." Jus-
tice Frankfurter also found that it was quite difficult to think of any
governmental activity on the operational level which is uniquely govern-
mental in that, at one time or another, it could have been or may have
been privately performed. The opinion outlined the purpose of the act
with the following words:
The broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to effect was
to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental
activities in circumstances like unto those in which a private person would
be liable and not to leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden
of individual private laws.
The Indian Towing Company case indicates that liability in the present
situation is highly probable, as the case makes clear the impending lia-
bility of a negligent act done at an "operational level."
A case which may have some direct application to the situation under
discussion is Eastern Airlines, Inc. vs. Union Trust Company." This case
concerned the negligence of a federal tower controller who was respon-
sible for directing aircraft at the Washington National Airport when a
mid-air collision occurred between an Eastern DC-4 and a Bolivian P-38
21350 U.S. 61 (1955).
2 An excellent discussion of this particular area is found in Ravonier v. U.S., 352 U.S. 316
(1956).
23221 F.2d 62 (D.D.C. 1955) cert. den. 350 U.S. 911 (1957).
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military plane. The government argued that its tower operators perform
governmental function of a regulatory nature, and that no private indi-
vidual had such power of regulation; therefore, this particular set of facts
did not come within the provision of the act which specified liability only
under circumstances in which a private person would also be liable.'
The court traced the historical development of airport control and found
an indication that private ownership and control of airports did then exist
(November 1, 1949) and had existed throughout the development of the
aircraft industry. In addition, it would also seem that the government's
argument regarding the "uniquely governmental" aspect of airport con-
trol might possibly fall subject to Justice Frankfurter's "good samaritan"
argument in the Indian Towing Company case.
The government also argued, as it had in the Dalehite case, that a con-
troller's exercise of judgment is a matter of discretion and would come
under the exemption of section 2680 (a). However, the court held that
tower operators merely handle operational details which are outside the
area of discretionary functions and falling within the "operational level"
category. The Eastern case dealt with controllers operating at the airport
itself, and perhaps a distinction may arise between that case and the present
situation which involves controllers operating in the area control center
which is not a part of the particular approach control centers at the in-
dividual airports.
Mr. Najeeb Halaby, in his testimony before a House Subcommittee on
Appropriations for the 1965 budget, gave the following general reason
for the Justice Department's desire to settle in this particular case:"
The Department of Justice, after carefully looking over that case, said that
the litigation risk of the judge and/or jury holding the government culpable
indicated that we had better settle, and so the judge got the parties together
-that was United Airlines, T.W.A., and of course, they were represented
by insurers, and the FAA represented by the Department of Justice-and
worked out a formula.
Mr. Halaby indicated that the FAA was not altogether satisfied with the
settlement, and the Justice Department responded to the FAA's trepida-
tions. This response was related to the Subcommittee by Mr. Halaby:
The answer from the Department of Justice was-perhaps to you technicians
that is clear, but with a judge and a jury the risk is that they might find the
United States entirely liable for not having taken some affirmative action
to vector the innocent aircraft away or to vector the overtaking aircraft
away.
One clarification is required here. The Tort Claims Act provides specific-
ally that any claim against the United States is to be tried without a jury."'
Mr. Halaby's testimony should be read with this fact in mind. One may
conclude that previous judicial interpretation of the Tort Claims Act, as
well as Mr. Halaby's testimony, would certainly indicate a strong possi-
bility that the government would have been held liable had the case gone
to trial.
24 Note 19 supra.
25 Note 21 supra.
" Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representa-
tives, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 1 at 1155 (1964).
2728 U.S.C. § 2402 (1948).
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Mr. Halaby, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee, indi-
cated that 104 cases have arisen out of this collision and that fifty-eight
had been settled at that time." The fifty-eight cases had produced a total
liability of 7,347,000 dollars. As indicated previously, the Justice Depart-
ment had agreed to settle for twenty-four per cent of the total liability,
thus creating an already determined liability of the government for
1,763,000 dollars." FAA officials indicated that total liability from all
104 cases should be approximately 12,000,000 dollars with governmental
liability of approximately 3,000,000 dollars." Mr. Halaby also pointed
out to the Subcommittee that awards have been steadily increasing, and
as of December 31, 1963, 371 cases amounting to 153,000,000 dollars
were pending against the FAA. It is interesting to note that if the case
had been tried and lost, the Justice Department would have been re-
sponsible for paying the judgment out of its budget. However, since the
case was settled, the FAA is liable out of its budget.3' However, the pros
and cons of liability in general, and this settlement in particular, must be
judged in the light of an ultimate taxpayer liability.
There are two general conflicting public policy arguments concerning
governmental liability. One argument, as pointed out by the Supreme
Court in Rayonier vs. United States," is the desirability of having the cost
of some mishap spread rather thinly among the taxpayers rather than being
heaped upon an individual merely because of a doctrine of immunity. This
benevolent approach is countered by the argument that there is an increas-
ing cost of paying these claims which not only are growing in number but
in size. These two valid arguments should be reconciled to create a moder-
ate, workable approach. Both bear merit, but neither is desirable without
modification by the other.
In discussing the pros and cons of an out-of-court settlement by an
executive department, factors to be taken into consideration include:
1. population growth;
2. expansion of the federal government both in size and in the number
of services performed; and
3. increasing dollar awards.
An out-of-court settlement by an executive department is not necessarily
a precedent for future judicial determination (that is, not a basis for
stare decisis) but could be the basis for future executive settlement.3
In other words, if the Justice Department can settle for 3,000,000 dollars
today, then why not 6,000,000 dollars tomorrow, ad infinitum? Is the
executive bound by the same criteria that surround a judicial decision?
Would those standards set by the Supreme Court as discussed previously
be strictly adhered to by the executive; or would social, economic and,
more importantly, political considerations cause these standards to be
stretched beyond those of even the most liberal court?
Assuming, for purposes of expediency, that an executive settlement can,
with limitation, be desirable, what presently checks the power of the




31 Note 28, supra.
32 Note 22, supra.
83 Note 29 supra, see the statement by Rep. Harold C. Ostertag.
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present checks prove ineffective? The Tort Claims Act provides that such
settlements may be made by the Attorney General with approval of the
District Court. 4 It is questionable, however, whether a court would devote
as much attention and care to granting its approval as it would in deter-
mining the final outcome of a lawsuit being heard before it. The act also
provides that the head of the federal agency concerned in the settlement
will pay such settlement out of appropriations available to such agency. 5
To this extent, Congress presumably could exercise some supervision over
such settlements through its control over appropriations. The issue then
becomes whether these two aforementioned controls are sufficiently effec-
tive. Assuming that some control over the executive is necessary and de-
sirable under our form of government, should additional controls be
created which would provide some check on the executive, yet not hamper
the effectiveness of an expedient, practical method for out-of-court settle-
ments? Certainly some sort of middle ground should be reached. A few
possible additional controls would be:
1. a dollar limit set by Congress.
2. annual responsibility by the Justice Department to an enlightened
Congressional Committee.
3. closer scrutiny by courts before granting approval.
The first suggestion could prove to be impractical due to its inflexibility.
The third suggestion is desirable, but difficult to regulate. The second sug-
gestion would seem to provide a partial solution, providing such a Con-
gressional Committee would not devote most of its time to "witch hunt-
ing" and would allow sensible expenditures. The settlement of October
23, 1963, will have its long-term ramifications not only in the airline in-
dustry,"6 which will necessarily call for further settlements of this type,
but in almost every phase of governmental activity falling within the
Tort Claims Act.
James T. Lloyd
Constitutional Law - Eminent Domain - Airport Noise
Plaintiffs, owners of 196 homes south of the primary north-south run-
way of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, brought inverse con-
demnation suits against the Port of Seattle, owner of the airport, seeking
damages for an alleged taking or damaging of their property for public
use caused by take-off and landing of jet aircraft at defendant's airport.
Plaintiff contended that the use of the airport by jet aircraft had un-
reasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of their properties' and
3428 U.S.C. § 2677 (1948).
3'28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1948).
"s The problem is particularly acute with respect to airline disasters, involving extensive prop-
erty damage and loss of life among persons whose earning capacity is correlative with air travel. See
note 26 supra.
' Plaintiffs describe the noise of the jets as a "short, penetrating and piercing . . . whining, shrill
sound" like a "piece of chalk on a blackboard screeching." When a jet passes overhead or close
by, conversation is halted, radio and television reception disrupted and the sound obliterated, sleep
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had caused substantial depreciation in the value of those properties, suffic-
ient to constitute a "taking" under both the United States' and Washing-
ton' Constitutions, or a "damaging" under the Washington Constitution.
In the alternative, plaintiffs claimed damages on a nuisance theory.4 The
trial court found that the overflights of jet aircraft over the homes of
140 of the plaintiffs' amounted to a taking of an air easement without
just compensation and as to the other group of fifty-six plaintiffs that the
regular low flights near by amounted to a damaging of the properties
without payment of just compensation. The plaintiffs were denied recovery
on the nuisance theory. The matter of actual damages was left to showing
of proof on a plot-by-plot basis in subsequent proceedings. Held: In
pleading the interference with the use and enjoyment of their land, with
a subsequent decline in market value, plaintiffs stated a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Washington Supreme Court, sitting in banc,
unanimously (9-0) declined to require direct overflights as necessary in
order to recover for either taking or damaging.! Martin et. al. v. Port of
Seattle, Aarbus et. al. v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 324, 391 P.2d 540
(1964)."
Inverse condemnation, as defined in Thornburg v. Port of Portland,'
is the popular term describing an action brought against a governmental
entity having the power of eminent domain to recover the value of
property which has been appropriated with no exercise of the power of
condemnation. This power of condemnation, or eminent domain, is an
inherent political right founded upon grounds of common interest and
necessity to preserve the sovereign's existence in perpetuity"° and permits
the sovereign to condemn property for public use without the owner's
disrupted, and many persons, especially small children, are frightened. The vibration makes it neces-
sary to hammer the nails back into the siding of the homes about every six months and to tighten
the light fixtures, and the vibration is sometimes so bad that crystal "will walk on the table."
Brief for Respondent, p. 5.
'U.S. Const. amend. V: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. "
a Wash. Const. art I, § 16, amend. 9: "No private property shall be taken or damaged for
public or private use without just compensation having been first made ....
'See, e.g., Delta Air Corporation v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1945); Thrasher v.
City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628,
42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, Inc., I N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (Ch.
Div. 1948); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179 (1948).
'All forty-six of the plaintiffs in Martin and ninety-four of the plaintiffs in Aarhus owned
property lying directly beneath the "localizer beam" of the Instrument Landing System while the
property of the remaining plaintiffs in Aarhus is located outside the localizer beam but within the
approach area to the north-south runway. Brief for Respondent, p. 18. Pilots use the localizer beam
on an instrument approach to obtain horizontal information and, on a proper landing, an aircraft
will stay within the beam limits, preferably midway between each outer limit. The center of the
beam is directly down the center of the runway extended, with a beam width of four degrees. The
arc thus described is 1,315 wide at the northern boundary of the litigated area, 1,760.8 feet wide
at the southern edge. Brief for Respondent, pp. 70-71.
391 P.2d 540, 545:
Recovery for interference with the use of land should [not] depend upon anything as
irrelevant as whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes through some fraction of an
inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's head. The plaintiffs are not seeking
recovery for a technical trespass, but for a combination of circumstances engendered
by the nearby flights which interfere with the use and enjoyment of their land.
Cases were filed separately, but consolidated both for trial and on appeal.
8233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
9376 P.2d at 101.
OKohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
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consent.1 The subject matter of any inverse condemnation suit is always
private property, and in the airport noise cases, the only property right
having any value to the possessor of the land is his ability to use and enjoy
his land, whether his interest is in fee, for life, for years, or a mere in-
corporeal interest such as an easement. 2 Property consists not merely of
technical ownership and possession, but also of the unrestricted right of
use, 3 enjoyment and disposal." The taking" may be trespassory,4 but it
may also be nuisance, 7 as "a nuisance can be such an invasion of the rights
of a possessor as to amount to a taking, in theory at least, any time a
possessor is in fact ousted from the enjoyment of his land."'" The court in
Thornburg further said that while the argument of the majority in Batten
v. United States" apparently adhered to the rule that only a trespass in
the airspace, i.e. an overflight, would give rise to an action for a taking,
and that in actions against the government nuisance principles should not
be applied, yet such a view does violence to the law of servitudes, though
it may have some basis as a policy argument."
The court based its holding on its own earlier decision in Ackerman v.
Port of Seattle" and that of the United States Supreme Court in Griggs
v. County of Allegheny," while expressly declining' to follow the Tenth
Circuit in Batten v. United States." In Ackerman, plaintiffs were owners
of vacant and unoccupied land in the vicinity of the Seattle-Tacoma In-
ternational Airport, and sought to recover damages for the diminution of
value of their land by numerous low flights directly over the property.
In deciding that the plaintiffs, in alleging a constitutional taking, had
stated a cause of action, the Washington high court recognized the con-
siderable interest and significance in this relatively new problem, and the
probability of its becoming more important in the future." Holding that
the alleged continuing and frequent low flights over the plaintiffs' land
amounted to taking an air easement for the purpose of flying airplanes
"Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385 (N.D. Ohio 1888).
" 376 P.2d at 105.
13 "The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of
the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right." Spann v. City of Dallas,
III Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
'"Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 644 (1960).
"United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917): ". . . it is the character of the invasion,
not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines
the question whether it is a taking." Cf. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 545
(1914); Baltimore and P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1883); Guith v. Consumers
Power Co., 36 F.Supp. 21 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
" E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir, 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, supra note 14.
17 See supra note 8.
is 376 P.2d at 105.
9306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 955 (1963). Noted 29 J. Air L. &
Com. 72 (1963).
2 376 P.2d at 104.
2" 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
22 369 U.S. 84 (1962). The Supreme Court relied upon Ackerman in reaching its decision, as
follows: ". . an adequate approach way is as necessary a part of the airport as is the ground on
which the airport, itself, is constructed." 369 U.S. at 90.
23 391 P.2d 540, 545. The court said: "[T]hat a landowner show a direct overflight as a con-
dition precedent to recovery of the damages to his land, is presently stressed by some federal courts
in construing the 'taking' as contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. Batten v. United States (10th Cir. 1962), "306 F.2d 580. We are unable to accept the
premise. ... (Emphasis supplied).
24 See supra note 19.
" 348 P.2d at 668.
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over the land,8 the court said that the Port of Seattle was liable because it
had failed to secure an approachway sufficient to protect the private air-
space of adjacent landowners. 7 In Batten, ten property owners brought
suit against the United States for an alleged taking of their property,
adjacent to Forbes Air Force Base, Kansas, under Tucker Act provisions"
allowing actions against the United States for certain claims in non-tort
cases. In a split decision, the Tenth Circuit denied recovery on the grounds
that there must either be a direct encroachment on the property by a
physical object, 9 or government action so complete as to deprive the owner
of "all or most"" of his interest in the land.2"
In the instant case, in arriving at its decision, the court also swept aside
the arguments revolving around "substantial" interference2 as opposed to
"incidental" damaging."2 The idea that the individual must bear part of
the inconvenience and loss of peace and quiet as the cost of living in a
modern society is inherent in the "substantial interference" theory. The
court reasons, however, that since in an inverse condemnation action, the
plaintiff seeks no recovery for his "individual suffering, damage, loss of
quiet, or other disturbance,"' 4 but only for the decreased market value of
his land," the balance of interest which might be necessary in a tort action,
where these elements are cognizable, need not be accomplished as a distinct
process since lowering of market value of the property reflects the lessened
desirability of the land to the general public. Hence, where there is only
"incidental" injury, there would be no provable or measurable decline in
market value traceable to the flights, and the necessary balancing would
be the net result. The court agreed with defendant's contention that cer-
tain portions of the airspace were placed in the public domain by Congress
in a series of enactments, beginning with the Air Commerce Act of 1926,8
25 348 P.2d at 671.
27 Ibid.
" Actions on claims "not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort" may be maintained under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952).
29 Jensen v. United States, _Ct. Cl._, 305 F.2d 444 (1962).
's United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
3 Chief Judge Murrah, in his dissent, found it unnecessary to adhere to a strict trespass rule,
and suggested compensation whenever the interference with the use of the land is of sufficient
directness, peculiarity and magnitude "that fairness and justice, as between the State and the
citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by the individual alone."
306 F.2d at 587.
2"The terms 'substantial injury' and 'substantial interference' appear commonly in the de-
cided cases, sometimes as if it were the sine qua non of recovery. The terms are not pertinent, how-
ever, in the 'inverse condemnation' context, where .. . the plaintiff .. . is usually claiming a
partial taking or damaging rather than a total loss of the land itself." 391 P.2d at 546.
"But see Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904). The United States had constructed
revetments on the Mississippi which directed the river against the claimants' land six miles below,
eroding and overflowing 2300 acres. In affirming the dismissal of the action by the Court of Claims,
the Supreme Court said, "The Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken with-
out just compensation, but a distinction has been made between damage and taking, and that dis-
tinction must be observed in applying the constitutional provision."
24 Personal inconvenience or discomfort to the owner of land does not provide an independent
basis for liability under the principles of eminent domain law. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain §
6.4432(2) at pp. 348-49 (3d ed. 1950).
" Contra, U.S. v. 3276.21 Acres of Land (Miramar), 222 F.Supp. 887 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
wherein the court said: "We hold that the inconvenience, injury or damage suffered by a land-
owner by flights which did not become so extensive or oppressive as to constitute a taking are not
matters which may be considered in a condemnation case."
's Ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 574 (1926). "As used in this Act, the term 'navigable airspace' means
airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under
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and continuing basically unchanged until the Federal Aviation Act of
195827 redefined navigable airspace"8 to include any and all airspace "needed
to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."'" However, it was
emphasized that "it does not follow from the inability of the landowner
to enjoin the use of the navigable airspace . . . that he should be unable
also to recover for a decline in the market value of his land which was
brought about or inflicted for the public benefit."4 There is a privilege to
use the navigable airspace, but this does not constitute relief from liability
for damage or provable pecuniary loss to property owners below, whether
in the process of take-off41 or landing or above 500 feet.
42
The Port of Seattle also advanced the argument that if there was a
taking in a constitutional sense, it was the United States which was liable
because of the 1958 inclusion of the air space necessary for take-offs and
landings within the navigable airspace.43 While the Martin court did not
expressly rule on this, it would appear to be foreclosed by the United
States Supreme Court's language in Griggs:
It is argued that though there was a 'taking,' someone other than respondent
was the taker-the airlines or the C.A.A. acting as an authorized representa-
tive of the United States. We think, however, that respondent, which was
the promoter, owner, and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances
the one who took the air easement in the constitutional sense."
The decision in Martin is diametrically opposed, in most aspects, to the
holdings of the lower federal courts, especially Batten." It would appear
that Martin is more closely in line with the Supreme Court's holding in
Griggs and that whenever the Supreme Court is required to rule on this
question, it is most likely to follow the lead of the Washington court and
allow recovery regardless of the presence or absence of actual trespassory
overflights, overruling Batten in the process. It is possible, of course, that
the distinction will be retained as between military and civilian airport
operations, but this distinction would be grossly unfair and is unwarranted.
In the meantime, property owners afflicted with falling property values
because of airport operations, have a progressive, forward-looking case
upon which to base their claims.
Charles A. Thompson
Section 3, and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate
and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act."
0772 Star. 737, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (24) (Supp. 1962).
"s Federal Aviation Authority regulations prescribe the minimum altitude of flight to be 500
feet (1,000 feet over congested areas). 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1964).
39 See supra note 37.
40391 P.2d at 544. See also Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super. 346 61 A.2d 645
(Ch. Div. 1948).
41 Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 225, 171 F.Supp. 283 (1959).
42Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
'Brief for Appellant, pp. 193-202; Brief for Respondent, pp. 57-58.
4369 U.S. at 89.
42 See e.g., Moore v. United States, 185 F.Supp 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Freeman v. United
States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
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Jurisdiction - Construction of Statute - Aircraft Piracy
On April 13, 1962, the pilot of a private airplane, a Cessna 172, was
kidnapped at gun point and forced by David Thomas Healy and an
accomplice to fly from Dade County, Florida, to the Republic of Cuba.
A federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against the de-
fendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, charging: (1) that the defendants had violated the Federal Kid-
napping Act' and; (2) that the defendants had committed "aircraft
piracy" in violation of a 1961 amendment to the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958.' Prior to the trial, the district court dismissed both counts of the
indictment and, as to the second count, ruled that the alleged piracy of
the private aircraft did not come within the "aircraft piracy" amendment,
because the Cessna 172 was not "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" as
required by the statute. The district court construed the language of the
statute to apply only to commercial airlines engaged in the carriage of
goods and persons for hire. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certi-
orari." Held: A private aircraft is "an aircraft in flight in air commerce"
within the statute defining aircraft piracy.' United States v. Healy, 376
U.S. 75 (1964).
The great variance in state laws which provide for jurisdiction and
venue and the lack of federal legislation concerning crimes committed in
the air has been of such significance that several crimes committed aboard
aircraft have gone unpunished.7 Prosecutors have had considerable trouble
in these cases because of the difficulty in determining a proper forum in
order to bring persons guilty of air crimes to trial. The difficulty had
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948).
'75 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i) (Supp. IV, 1961):
(i) (1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein defined,
shall be punished-
(a) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or, in the case
of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant has waived
a trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order; or
(b) by imprisonment for not less than twenty years, if the death penalty
is not imposed.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "aircraft piracy" means any seizure or
exercise of control by force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in
flight in air commerce.
'United States v. Healy, 8 Av. L. Rep. (1963 Aviation Cases) 17,521 (S.D. Fla. September 17,
1962).
' United States v. Healy, cert. granted, 372 U.S. 963 (1963): A direct appeal is permitted from
a United States District Court by or on behalf of the United States when the dismissal of an in-
dictment is based on the construction of the statute on which the indictment is based, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The United States petitioned for rehearing in the United States District Court
and rehearing being denied, notice of appeal was filed within thirty days from the date of denial
of rehearing, but not within thirty days from the date of entry of the original judgment. The
Supreme Court, in considering the respondent's contention that they were without jurisdiction due
to the Governments extension of the time for appeal stated that, "A rehearing petition, at least
when filed within the original period for review may . . .extend the time for filing a petition for
certiorari by a criminal defendant . . . [and] criminal judgments are nonfinal for purposes of
appeal so long as timely rehearing petitions are pending." See, e.g., Panico v. United States, 375 U.S.
29 (1963).
' United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964) at 81: In reversing the district court the Supreme
Court held that the first count of the indictment had been improperly dismissed and that a motive
of pecuniary profit was not required under 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
'See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 §§ 1-6 (1961); N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann., Book 66,
Part 1, § 137; Cal. Pen. Code § 177.
'See I U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2564 (1961); N.Y. Times, July 25, 1961, p. 1, col. 7;
Id., Aug. 10, 1961, p. 1, col. 4.
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arisen when an aircraft's point of departure was in one state and its point
of destination in another! In order to bring a criminal to trial prior to the
1961 aircraft piracy amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, a
prosecutor had to prove that the crime had been committed in the air-
space over the state in which the trial was to be conducted. In many in-
stances prosecutors have been unable to establish the requisite jurisdiction
and venue United States v. Bearden"° is an example of federal prosecution
of an aircraft hijacking prior to the 1961 aircraft piracy amendment.
Leon Bearden and his son, aboard a commercial flight from Phoenix,
Arizona, to Houston, Texas, announced to the crew that they were taking
command and intended to proceed to Mexico and then to Cuba. The
Beardens were apprehended in El Paso, Texas, and a six count indictment
was brought against Leon Bearden," charging him with "knowingly trans-
porting in interstate commerce persons whom he had unlawfully seized
for purpose of stealing aircraft knowing it to have been stolen, and ob-
struction and attempt to obstruct commerce by extortion."'2 Bearden was
convicted but the case was later reversed because of an improper jury
charge." This case illustrates the variety of statutes that federal prosecutors
were compelled to utilize prior to the 1961 aircraft piracy amendment. 4
In at least one other case of a criminal act committed aboard an aircraft
in flight, the federal government was unable to prosecute the offender
because of the absence of a federal statute." Prior to the 1961 amendments
to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 there was no federal statute directly
in point. Jurisdiction of crimes committed in the airspace and territorial
waters of the states were considered within the jurisdiction of the state
courts under the theory of retained police power."
In light of the problem which existed in relation to crimes committed
aboard aircraft in flight, the Congress, in September 1961, passed Public
Law 87-197' amending in part the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The
1961 aircraft piracy amendment sets forth the following elements which
constitute the crime of aircraft piracy: (1) seizure or exercise of control;
(2) by force or violence or threat of force or violence; (3) with wrongful
'See generally Bradford, The Legal Ramifications of Hijacking Airplanes, 48 A.B.A.J. 1034
(1962).
'See Hearings on S. 2268, S. 2370, S. 237 3, and S. 2374 Before an Aviation Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
10304 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied, 307 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 372 U.S. 252 (1962), reversed and affirmed in part, 320 F.2d 99 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 922 (1964).
" Defendant's son Cody Bearden was also indicted and pleaded guilty under the Juvenile
Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
" In order to obtain a conviction in the Bearden case the government had to make use of the
several statutes including 18 U.S.C. § 1201 asserting violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18
U.S.C. 5 2312 asserting the transportation of a stolen vehicle, and 18 U.S.C. S 1951 asserting inter-
ference with commerce by threats or violence (racketeering).
"3320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1963) at 103: The court reversed its own decision on the grounds
that the district judge failed to properly instruct the jury as to the main elements of counts one
and three of the indictment which dealt with transportation.
14 United States v. Bearden, 304 F.2d at 540: Judge Rives, in a dissenting opinion, pointed out
that the new "aircraft piracy" amendment would have been applicable had not the hijacking by
the Beardens been committed prior to the passage of the amendment. See note 12, supra.
"Graham v. People, 134 Colo. 1290, 302 P. 2d 737 (1956).
1" See generally Brown, Jurisdiction of United States Courts over Crimes in Aircraft, 15 Stan.
L. Rev. 45 (1962-1963).
1775 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)-(n) (Supp. IV, 1961); 75 Stat. 467, 49 U.S.C. § 1473
(a) (Supp. IV, 1961); See 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2563 (1961).
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intent."8 The preceeding elements constitute aircraft piracy only if the
aircraft is "an aircraft in flight in air commerce." The passage of this
legislation, which extended the Federal Aviation Act to cover the criminal
acts of aircraft piracy, murder, manslaughter, assault, maiming, carrying
concealed weapons, and stealing personal property, and which provided for
venue for these offenses," was accelerated because of the occurence of
several criminal acts, including hijacking, aboard aircraft during 1961.0
This legislation was accompanied by Special Civil Air Regulations" issued
by the Federal Aviation Agency to aid in the prevention of aircraft hi-
jacking. By enacting this legislation, Congress apparently did not intend
to pre-empt the jurisdiction of the states, but merely to supplement it,
therefore, giving the federal government concurrent jurisdiction with the
states in order to facilitate the protection of air commerce and effectively
administer justice."
In deciding the Healy case, the Supreme Court construed the term "an
aircraft in flight in air commerce" to include a private aircraft, stating
that "The Cessna 172 was 'an aircraft'; it was 'in flight'; [and] it was in
flight 'in air commerce'. . " In support of their holding, the Court relied on
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, section 101, 24 the legislative history of
the aircraft piracy amendment," and statements from the Congressional
Record." The Court referred to the legislative history repeatedly, with
the most forceful showing of legislative intent being a distinction made
between subsections (1) and (i) of Section 1472. 7 Subsection (1) is
applicable only to an aircraft being operated "by an air carrier in air
transportation," in contrast to the term "an aircraft in flight in air com-
merce" as required by subsection (i). This distinction shows that a broad
connotation was apparently intended by the drafters of subsection (i)
when the term "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" was utilized. Further
"75 Star. 466, 49 U.S.C. 5 1472 (i) (Supp. IV, 1961), supra note 2.
1075 Stat. 467, 49 U.S.C. 5 1473 (a) (Supp. IV, 1961):
(a) The trial of any offense under this chapter shall be in the district in which such
offense is committed; or, if the offense is committed out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state or district, the trial shall be in the district where the offender, or any
one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought. If such offender or
offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or informa-
tion may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any
one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or
information may be filed in the District of Columbia. Whenever the offense is begun
in one jurisdiction and completed in another, or committed in more than one jurisdic-
tion, it may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined and punished in any juris-
diction in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed, in the same manner
as if the offense had been actually and wholly committed therein.
10 See U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, supra note 17; N.Y. Times, supra note 7.
"Special Civil Air Regulation No. SR-448, 26 Fed. Reg. 7009 (1961) (superseeded Oct. 9,
1961); Special Civil Air Regulation No. 448A, 26 Fed. Reg. 9669 (1961).
"See U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, supra note 17 at 2565.
'" United States v. Healy, supra note 5 at 83.
2472 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (4) (1958):
(4) "Air Commerce" means interstate overseas, or foreign air commerce or the
transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within
the limits of any federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which
directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate overseas, or foreign air
commerce.
25 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, supra note 17.
"6 107 Cong. Rec. 16545 (1961) (remarks of Congressman Harris); 107 Cong. Rec. 16547-
16548 (1961) (remarks of Congressman Williams); 107 Cong. Rec. 15243 (1961) (remarks of
Senator Engle).
2775 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. S 1472 (1) (Supp. IV, 1961); 75 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i)
(Supp. IV, 1961), supra note 2.
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evidence of the broad intent of the term in question, which was not
brought out by the Supreme Court, includes Special Civil Air Regulations
issued by the Federal Aviation Agency. The FAA, in issuing Special Civil
Air Regulation No. SR-448A, pointed out that paragraph 1 of SR-448
applied only to aircraft being operated in "air commerce," in order ". . . to
broaden the scope of the provision to provide similar protection to those
general aviation operations and operations conducted for compensation or
hire which are not considered as air transportation under the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958."2s
The Healy case is the first reported case"9 under the 1961 aircraft piracy
amendment and is significant for several reasons. The case illustrates the
effect which the legislation has had on the jurisdictional problems which
existed prior to the 1961 amendment. The Healy case illustrates the types
of aircraft that the new aircraft piracy statute encompasses. The Supreme
Court construed the term "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" to include
private aircraft, and in construing the term in this manner has given it a
broad meaning in line with the legislative intent, and has also interpreted
the statute to provide for jurisdiction and venue over both commercial
and private aircraft in flight if and when a criminal act is committed
aboard such aircraft. Although the Healy case stands primarily for the
Supreme Court's recognition of a private aircraft as "an aircraft in
flight in air commerce," it is also illustrative of the venue provisions in
Section 1473 which relate to all crimes set out in Section 1472. In the
instant case the offense was begun in the Southern District of Florida and
completed in the Republic of Cuba."° It can be seen by reference to the
1961 amendment to Section 1473, that the amendment was apparently
relied upon by the prosecutors in the Healy case. A portion of the amend-
ment states, "Whenever the offense is begun in one jurisdiction and com-
pleted in another . . .it may be dealt with ...in the same manner as if
the offense had been actually and wholly committed therein." It appears
that the 1961 amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, taken
in conjunction with the Supreme Court's construction of the section re-
lating to aircraft piracy, have effectively solved the problems of jurisdiction
and venue which were present prior to the enactment of the 1961 legis-
lation, and that any person who commits a crime aboard an aircraft in
flight in the future, will find himself amenable to federal and, in many
instances, state prosecution.
Edward A. Peterson
"SSpecial Civil Air Regulation No. 448 A, supra note 22; See 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. 1301
(10) (1958): Air transportation is there defined as "interstate, overseas, or foreign air transporta-
tion or the transportation of mail by aircraft."
"8United States v. Albert Miller Brooks, Criminal Information No. 6372 (W.D. Va. 1962),
was the first case to be prosecuted under the new law. The defendant was charged and pleaded
guilty.
'"See N.Y. Times, April 22, 1962, p. 7, col. 1: The Republic of Cuba returned David Thomas
Healy, M. Oeth (his accomplice), and the pilot to the United States, but retained the airplane.
